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Abstract
We present an empirical study of price reversion after the executed metaorders.
We use a data set with more than 8 million metaorders executed by institutional
investors in the US equity market. We show that relaxation takes place as soon
as the metaorder ends:while at the end of the same day it is on average ≈ 2/3 of
the peak impact, the decay continues the next days, following a power-law function
at short time scales, and converges to a non-zero asymptotic value at long time
scales (∼ 50 days) equal to ≈ 1/2 of the impact at the end of the first day. Due
to a significant, multiday correlation of the sign of executed metaorders, a careful
deconvolution of the observed impact must be performed to extract the estimate of
the impact decay of isolated metaorders.
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1 Introduction
It is now well documented that a series of buy (/sell) trades, originating from the
same institution, pushes on average the price upwards (/downwards), by a quantity
proportionnal to the square-root of the total volume Q of the buy trades – see e.g.
[5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 24]. What happens when such a series of trades (often
called a “metaorder”) is completed? One expects that once the extra buy (/sell)
pressure subsides, impact will revert somewhat. There is however no consensus on
the detailed behaviour of such impact decay. The long-run asymptotic price after
the metaorder is expected to depend on the information on which trading is based,
so it is customary to decompose the observed impact into a “reaction” impact, that
is a mechanical property of markets, unrelated to information, and a “prediction
impact” that depends on the quality of information contained in the trade [2].
From a modeling point of view, several hypotheses have been put forward. In
the stylized, “fair pricing” theory of Farmer, Gerig, Lillo & Waelbroeck (FGLW)
[17], an equilibrium condition is derived between liquidity providers and a broker
aggregating informed metaorders from several funds, in which the average price
payed during the execution is equal to the price at the end of the reversion phase. If
metaorder size distribution is power law with tail exponent 3/2, the observed impact
is predicted to decay towards a plateau value whose height is 2/3 of the peak impact,
i.e. the impact reached exactly when the metaorder execution is completed. Within
the “latent order book” model [15, 22], reaction impact is expected to decay as a
power-law of time, reaching a (small) asymptotic value after times corresponding
to the memory time of the market [18]. A similar behaviour is predicted by the
propagator model [3]. Note that while the latent order book model predicts that
the permanent reaction impact is linear in Q [18] (in agreement with no-arbitrage
arguments [9, 10]), the FGLW theory implies that permanent impact scales as the
peak impact, i.e. as
√
Q.
As far as empirical data is concerned, the situation is rather confusing, mostly
because the determination of the time when the relaxation terminates is not unique.
Some papers, determining permanent impact shortly after the end of the metaorder,
have reported results compatible with the FGLW 2/3 factor [8, 13, 14, 19, 21], al-
though Gomes & Waelbroeck [13] note that the impact of uninformed trades appears
to relax to zero. Brokmann et al. [11], on the other hand, underline the importance
of metaorders split over many successive days, as this may strongly bias upwards
the apparent plateau value. After accounting for both metaorder correlations and
prediction impact, Brokmann et al. [11] conclude that impact decays as a power-law
over several days, with no clear asymptotic value. The work of Bacry et al. [12]
leads to qualitatively similar conclusions.
In the present paper, we revisit this issue using the same ANcerno database as
Zarinelli et al. [8], with a closer focus on impact decay. Extending the time horizon
beyond that considered in [8], we establish unambiguously that impact decays below
the 2/3 plateau, which is observed as average value of the impact at the end of
the same day of the metaorder execution. Specifically, we find that the overnight
contribution to impact decay is small, in agreement with the idea that the decay
takes place in “volume time” rather than in calendar time. After accounting for
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metaorder temporal correlations, impact decay is well fitted by a power-law for
intraday time scales and an exponentially truncated power-law for multiday horizons,
extrapolating to a plateau value ≈ 1/3 of the peak impact beyond several weeks. For
such long time lags, however, market noise becomes dominant and makes it difficult
to conclude on the asymptotic value of impact, which is a proxy for the (long time)
information content of the trades in our database.
2 Data & Definitions
2.1 The ANcerno Dataset
We use an heterogeneous dataset provided by ANcerno1, a leading transaction
cost analysis provider. The structure of this dataset allows the identification of
metaorders relative to the trading activity of a diversified pool of (anonymized)
institutional investors, although informations relative to the execution style and
motive of the transaction are not available. We define a metaorder as a series of
jointly reported executions of a single investor, through one broker within one day,
on a given stock and in a given direction. It follows that each metaorder is charac-
terized by a stock symbol, the total volume Q (in number of shares) and the times
at the start ts and at the end te of its execution with sign  = ±1. Our sample
covers for a total of 880 trading days, from January 2007 to June 2010 and we select
only stocks in the Russell 3000 index. The cleaning procedure introduced in Ref.
[8] and used in [16, 25] is applied to remove possible spurious effects. In this way
the available sample is represented by around 8 million metaorders distributed quite
uniformly in time and across market capitalizations representing around 5% of the
total market volume.2
2.2 Definitions
To characterize the metaorder execution of Q shares we introduce the following
observables as done in Ref. [8]: the participation rate η and the durationD measured
in volume time. The participation rate η is defined as the ratio between the volumeQ
traded by the metaorder and the whole market volume traded during the execution
time interval [ts, te]
η =
Q
V (te)− V (ts) , (1)
where V (t) is the cumulative volume transacted in the market between the start of
the day and time t. The metaorder duration in volume time D is expressed as
D =
V (te)− V (ts)
Vd
, (2)
1ANcerno Ltd (formerly the Abel Noser Corporation) is a widely recognized consulting firm that
works with institutional investors to monitor their equity trading costs. Its clients include many pension
funds and assets managers. Previous academic studies that use ANcerno data to investigate the market
impact at different times scales includes [8, 16, 25]. See www.ancerno.com for details.
2Without the above filters, this number would rise to about 10%.
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where Vd = V (tc) is the total volume traded until the close of the day t = tc. The
unsigned daily fraction φ := Q/Vd is then given by
φ = η ×D. (3)
The statistics of metaorders’ duration, participation rate, number of trades, etc. are
detailed in [8, 16]. For example, the participation rate η and the duration D are
both well approximated by truncated power-law distributions over several orders of
magnitude.
2.3 Market Impact
Let us briefly recall the main definition of market impact necessary to investigate in
the following how the price relaxes after the metaorder execution. An asset manager
decides to buy or to sell a metaorder of Q shares sending it at time t = ts to a broker
or to an execution algorithm where it is executed sequentially in smaller orders on
market until to completion at time t = te. The market impact is usually defined
in terms of the rescaled log-price s(t) := (log S(t))/σd, where S(t) is the price,
σd = (SHigh − SLow)/SOpen is a noisy estimator of the daily volatility, estimated
from the daily high, low and open prices.
Given the rescaled average market mid-price at the start of the metaorder s(ts)
and the end of its execution, s(te), we quantify its “Start-to-End” price impact ISE
with the following antisymmetric expectation
ISE(φ) = E[ · (s(te)− s(ts))|φ] (4)
where  = ±1 is the signed order size of the metaorder with volumeQ. In practice, we
compute the market impact curve ISE(φ) by dividing the data into evenly populated
bins according to the volume fraction φ and computing the conditional expectation
of impact for each bin [8, 12, 16]. Henceforth, error bars are determined as standard
errors. Similarly, we will define the “Start-to-Close” impact ISC by replacing in Eq.
(4) the end price s(te) by the close (log)price of the day s(tc).
3 Results
3.1 Intraday impact and post-trade reversion
In Fig. 1, we show the Start-to-End impact ISE and Start-to-Close impact ISC as
a function of the daily volume fraction φ. Clearly, ISE behaves as a square-root
of the volume fraction φ in an intermediate regime 10−3 . φ . 10−1, as reported
in many previous studies [5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 24]. For smaller volume
fractions, impact is closer to linear [8] – see [25] for a recent discussion of this effect.
The Start-to-Close impact, measured using exactly the same metaorders, is below
the Start-to-End impact (ISC < ISE), showing that some post-trade reversion has
taken place between the metaorder completion time te and the market close time tc.
The ratio between these two impact curves is plotted in Fig. 1 (Right panel).
Interestingly, the mean value over all φ is found to be 0.66±0.04, is close agreement
with the 2/3 ratio predicted by FGLW, thus confirming previous empirical findings
[8, 13, 14, 19, 21]. However, a closer look at the plot reveals that the ratio system-
atically increases as φ increases. Since larger metaorders (i.e. large φ) tend to take
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Figure 1: (Left panel) Start-to-End impact ISE and Start-to-Close impact ISC as a
function of the daily volume fraction φ. We also show the square-root impact law
I ∝ √φ (plain line) and a linear impact law (dotted line). The slope of ISC appears to
be larger than that of ISE as a consequence of a stronger impact decay contribution for
smaller φ’s. (Right panel) The ratio ISC(φ)/ISE(φ), computed in each volume fraction
bin φ. Its average over all φ is = 0.66± 0.04. The empirical distribution of the ratio is
presented in the inset. Note that for φ & 10−3, this ratio increases with φ.
longer to execute, one expects the End-to-Close time TEC = tc − te to decrease as
φ increases. Therefore impact decay between the end of the metaorder and the end
of the day should be, on average, more effective for small φ.
In order to validate this hypothesis, we now characterise the intraday price re-
version by computing the ratio ISC/ISE as a function of the variable z = VEC/VSE ,
where VEC = V (tc)−V (te) and VSE = V (te)−V (ts) are respectively the total mar-
ket volume executed in the time intervals TEC and TSE (similar results – not shown
– are obtained as a function of z′ = TEC/T , where T = te − ts is the metaorder
execution time). The results are shown in Fig. 2 (Left panel). One clearly sees that
impact decays continuously as z increases, and is in fact well fitted by the prediction
of the propagator model [2, 3], namely Iprop(z) = (1 + z)1−β − z1−β with β = 0.22.3
If one restricts to a smaller interval z ∈ [0, 2], as in [8, 19], one finds that the decay
appears to saturate around the 2/3 value (see Fig. 2, Inset), but zooming out leaves
no doubt that impact is in fact decaying to smaller values.
3.2 Next day reversion
Quite interestingly, impact decays much in the same way over the next day: in the
same figure we plot ISC2/ISE as a function of z = VEC2/VSE , where C2 refers to the
close of the next day and VEC2 = VEC+Vd (i.e. the overnight does not contribute to
TEC2). Provided one applies a factor ζ ≈ 4/5 that accounts for the autocorrelation
3To note, β is the decay exponent of the propagator, G(t) ∼ t−β , see e.g. [2].
5
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
ISC
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
I S
C
2
ISC2 = 0.83 ISC
ISC2
10−2 10−1 100 101 102
z
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
R
(z
)
ISC/ISE
ISC2/ISE
Iprop = (1 + z)1−β − z1−β
0 1 2
z
0.6
0.8
1.0
R
(z
) 2/3
Figure 2: (Left panel) Price relaxation R(z) over two consecutive days. Blue points:
impact decay within the same day of the metaorder’s execution, i.e. ISC/ISE as a
function of z = VEC/VSE , in a semi-log scale. Red points: impact decay using the
close of the next day, i.e. ζISC2/ISE as a function of z = VEC2/VSE , with ζ = 0.80.
Both sets of points are well fitted by the prediction of the propagator model: Iprop(z) =
(1 + z)1−β − z1−β with β = 0.22. (Inset): Same day impact decay, in a lin-lin plot
restricted to z ∈ [0, 2], suggesting relaxation towards a 2/3 value (horizontal line). (Right
panel) Average of Start-to-next day Close ISC2 , conditioned to different values of ISC .
The regression lines yield ISC2 = 0.83 ISC .
of metaorders (see next section, and Fig. 3 (Left panel))4, the next day impact decay
nicely falls in the continuation of the intraday decay, and is also well accounted for
by the very same scaling function Iprop(z).
Fig. 2 (Right panel) provides complementary information: we show the average
of ISC2 conditioned to different values of ISC , which clearly demonstrates that these
two quantities are proportional and related to the same decay mechanism. It shows
in particular that the impact measured at the end of the next day would still behave
as a square-root of the volume of the executed metaorder.
3.3 Impact decay over multiple days
Having established that impact decay occurs both intraday and during the next day,
it is tempting to conjecture that impact will continue to decay on longer time scales.
However, the empirical investigation of such a decay faces several hurdles. First,
as the time lag increases, the amount of noise induced by overall market moves be-
comes larger and larger (in fact as σd
√
τ , where τ is the number of days). Second,
4More precisely, we have set ζ = 1/(1 + C(1)), where C(τ) is the autocorrelation function plotted in
Fig. 3 (Left panel).
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Figure 3: (Left panel) Empirical autocorrelation of the signed square-root volume im-
balance Φ•1/2, as a function of the lag τ , averaged over all stocks. This autocorre-
lation persists over many days, as is fitted as an exponentially truncated power law
g(τ) = aτ−γe−bτ with a = 0.24± 0.04 and b = 0.038± 0.002 (corresponding to 1/d ' 26
days). The value of the exponent γ is fixed to 1−2β = 0.56, as dictated by the propaga-
tor model [3]. (Right panel) Normalized decay kernel G(τ)/G(0) estimated using Eq. 7
for τ ∈ [1, 50] days. The fit corresponds to the exponentially truncated modified propa-
gator model Im(τ) with b = 0.038 (see Left panel), which provides an asymptotic decay
level I∞ ≈ 0.42 ± 0.01 (fit errors only). The error bars on the graph are (i) bootstrap
errors (blue region) and (ii) cumulated regression errors (grey region). Inset: Normalized
“bare” response function R(τ)/R(0) as a function of τ (see definition in Eq. (9)).
metaorders are often executed over several days, leading to long range autocorre-
lations of the order flow. This effect, investigated considering metaorders from the
same fund [2], is here investigated by considering a very heterogeneous set of funds
and illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 3. We find that metaorder signs autocor-
relation is well fitted by an exponentially truncated power law with a time scale of
≈ 26 days and an exponent γ fixed by the propagator model constraint γ = 1− 2β.
Intuitively, these correlations may mask the decay of impact, as trades in the same
direction during the following days tend to counterbalance impact reversion, leading
to an apparent increase of impact (see Fig. 3, Right panel, Inset). This contribution
should be somehow removed to estimate the “natural” decay of impact.
A possible way to overcome the latter problem is to apply a deconvolution method
introduced by Brokmann et al. [11]. We will study our metaorder database at the
daily time scale with the same angle: for each day τ = {1, · · · , 880} and asset we
computed the net daily traded volume Φ(τ) =
∑N
i=1 iφi where N is the number of
metaorders in the database, for a given asset and a given day τ . As recently shown
in Ref. [16], the impact of a set of different metaorders, all executed the same day,
is well described by an extended square-root law where all metaorders are bundled
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together:
I = Y × σdΦ•1/2, (5)
where we use the notation x•1/2 = sign(x)
√|x|.
The return of the asset between the last day close and the close of each day τ is
denoted r(τ). The method used in [11] amounts to assuming a quasi-linear model,
i.e.
r(τ) = βcapm(τ) rM(τ) +
H∑
`=0
G(`) · σd × Φ˜•1/2(τ − `) + ξ(τ), (6)
where G(`) are coefficients, H is a certain horizon (taken to be H = 50 days), ξ is a
noise term and βcapm(τ) rM(τ) is the systematic component that takes into account
the market drift: βcapm(τ) is the beta of the traded stock computed on the period
from τ − 20 to τ + 20 and rM(τ) the daily close-close return of the market (here the
Russell 3000 index). Finally, Φ˜•1/2(τ) = Φ•1/2(τ)− βcapm(τ)〈Φ•1/2(τ)〉stocks, where
we subtract βcapm times the cross-sectional average of the expected impact.
Pooling all the stocks together,5 a least-square regression allows us to determine
the coefficients G(`), from which we reconstruct the ‘reactional’ impact kernel G(τ)
as
G(τ) =
τ∑
`=0
G(`). (7)
The kernel G(τ) is a proxy of the impact of an isolated metaorder. If the metaorder
was uniformed, G(τ) would describe the mechanical reaction of the market to such
a trade. Any non-zero asymptotic value of G(τ → ∞) would either reveal that
metaorders are on average informed, or that even random trades have positive per-
manent impact on prices (as in, e.g. [18]).
To estimate error bars, we generated 200 bootstrap samples using all 1500 stocks,
and ran the linear regression Eq. (6) on each of them. The average result is shown
in Fig. 3 (Right panel), together with error bars coming from the least-square
regression and from the bootstrap procedure. From this graph, we see that the
estimated impact kernel G(τ) slowly decays in a time window comparable with the
one over which we measure a persistent autocorrelation (as shown in the left panel
of Fig. 3). We have fitted the empirically determined, normalized impact kernel
Im(τ) := G(τ)/G(0) using an ad-hoc modified propagator kernel, that accounts for
a final exponential decay towards an asymptotic value I∞:
Im(τ) = I∞ + (1− I∞)Iprop(τ)e−bτ , (8)
where b is a parameter fixed by the corresponding decay of the flow autocorrelation,
see Fig. 3 (Left panel). Keeping the same shape for Iprop(τ) as the one describing
the short-term decay of impact (i.e. fixing β = 0.22),6 the one-parameter fit gives
I∞ ≈ 0.42.
Although the error bars are already large for τ = 50, the fit favors a non-zero
asymptotic value I∞ ≈ 1/2. Since the impact has on average already decayed to
approximately 2/3 of its peak value at the end of the trading day, this value of
I∞ suggests a long time asymptotic plateau at 2/3 × 1/2 ≈ 1/2 of the peak value,
5We have checked that different subsamples of the full sample lead to similar results (for example,
slicing the pool of stocks according to their market capitalisation, see Fig. 4).
6Leaving b free in a 2-parameter fit leads to very similar values: b = 0.03±0.01 and I∞ = 0.39±0.05.
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Figure 4: (Left panel) Empirical autocorrelation of the signed square-root volume im-
balance Φ•1/2, as a function of the lag τ , averaged over all stocks in a given market cap
tranche. Each function is fitted as an exponentially truncated power law g(τ) = aτ−γe−bτ
with γ = 0.56. The parameters a and b are very close in the three cases. (Right panel)
Normalized decay kernel G(τ)/G(0) estimated using Eq. 7 for τ ∈ [1, 50] days, again
using all stocks in a given market cap tranche. The fit corresponds to the exponentially
truncated modified propagator model Im(τ) with d = 0.038, which provides an asymp-
totic decay level I∞ ≈ 0.44 (large caps), I∞ ≈ 0.61 (mid cap) and I∞ ≈ 0.35 (small
cap), all within the grey region of Fig. 3, Right panel.
significantly below the 2/3 value predicted by FGLW (see also Fig. 2). This can
be taken as a measure of the information content of the trades in the ANcerno
database. Since we have no knowledge about the intensity of the trading signal
which triggered the metaorders,7 we cannot subtract the “alpha” component from
the observed returns, as was done in Ref. [11], where after removing the alpha of
the manager and the contribution of correlated trades, impact was found to decay
to ≈ 0.15 of its initial value after 15 days. Adding to the regressors of Eq. 6 past
values of (r− βcapmrM), as a proxy for mean-reversion and/or trending signals that
investors commonly use, we find a slightly larger plateau (≈ 0.54) when b is kept at
the value 0.038. This reveals how noisy the data is, because one would have expected
a decrease of I∞ when including more “alpha” signal in the regression. However, we
do observe mean reversion on short time scales and momentum beyond, as expected.
Finally, we also show in Fig. 3 (Right panel, inset) the full “response function”
R(τ), defined as [3]:
R(τ) =
τ∑
τ ′=0
E[r˜(τ + τ ′)Φ˜•1/2(τ)], (9)
7Following Ref. [23], we have attempted to identify “skilled” vs “unskilled” metaorders. However,
since we only have a broker-level identification of the metaorders, this attempt has not been fruitful.
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where r˜(τ) := r(τ)− βcapm(τ) rM(τ). This quantity elicits an apparent evolution of
impact, without accounting for metaorder autocorrelations. Such autocorrelations
are strong enough to make R(τ) increase as a function of τ (see [2, 3] for similar
results). This plot illustrates how the autocorrelation of order flow can strongly
bias the estimation of impact decay and its asymptotic value (see [11] for a similar
discussion).
4 Conclusion & Discussion
In this paper we presented an empirical study of the impact relaxation of metaorders
executed by institutional investors in the US equity market. We have shown that
relaxation takes place as soon as the metaorder ends, and continues the following
day with no apparent saturation at the plateau value corresponding to the “fair
pricing” theory. For example, the impact measured at the next-day close is, on
average, around 4/5 of the impact at the end of the day when the metaorder is
executed.
The decay of impact is described by a power-law function at short time scales,
while it appears to converge to a non-zero asymptotic value at long time scales
(∼ 50 days), equal to 1/2 of the initial impact (i.e. at the end of the first day). Due
to a significant, multiday correlation of the sign of executed metaorders, a careful
deconvolution of the observed impact must be performed to extract the reaction
impact contribution (where, possibly, some information contribution remains). Once
this is done, our results match qualitatively those of Ref. [11], obtained on a smaller
set of metaorders executed by a single manager (CFM). In particular, we find no
support for the prediction of Farmer et al. [17], that the permanent impact equal
to 2/3 of the peak impact.
Executing a quantity Q moves the price, on average, as I(Q) = Y σd(Q/Vd)
1/2,
where Y is a certain numerical constant [5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 24]. Assum-
ing that this impact is fully transient and decays back to zero at long times, the
corresponding average cost of trading is 2/3I(Q). If the investor predicts a certain
price variation ∆, his/her optimal trade size is given by the following maximization
problem:
Q∗ = argmax
[
∆Q− 2
3
QI(Q)
]
⇒ I(Q∗) = ∆. (10)
The last equation means that the investor should trade until his/her average impact
pushes the price up to the predicted level ∆, but not beyond. For truly informed
investors, there should be no decay of impact at all, since the price has been pushed
to its correctly predicted value. For uninformed investors, on the other hand, impact
should decay back to zero. Averaging over all metaorders of size Q, one should
therefore expect an apparent permanent impact given by:
I∞(Q) := f(Q)× I(Q) + (1− f(Q))× IR(Q), (11)
where f(Q) is the fraction of metaorders of volume Q that are truly informed and
IR(Q) is the permanent, reactional part of impact – expected to be zero only if mar-
kets were truly efficient. A precise empirical determination of the size dependence
of IR(Q) would be extremely interesting. However, this seems to be out of reach:
not only would it require a large data set of metaorders reputed to be information-
less (such as the portfolio transition trades of Ref. [13]), but also the error on the
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long-term asymptotic value of IR(Q) is bound to be very large, as Fig. 3 shows.
At this stage, it is thus difficult to confirm or infirm the validity of the theoretical
arguments that predict a linear-in-Q dependence of IR(Q) [9, 10, 18].
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